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PAYMENTS FOR C SEQUESTRATION TO ALLEVIATE DEVELOPMENT PRESSURE

Abstract
The purpose of this study was to determine individuals’ willingness to enroll in voluntary
payments for carbon sequestration programs through the use of a discrete choice experiment
delivered to forest owners living in the rapidly urbanizing region surrounding Charlotte, North
Carolina. We examined forest owners’ willingness to enroll in payments for carbon sequestration
policies under different levels of financial incentives (annual revenue), different contract lengths
and different program administrators (e.g., private companies versus a state or federal agency). We
also examined the influence forest owners’ sense of place had on their willingness to enroll in
hypothetical programs. Our results showed a high level of ambivalence towards participating in
payments for carbon sequestration programs. However, both financial incentives and contract
lengths significantly influenced forest owners’ intent to enroll. Neither program administration nor
forest owners’ sense of place influenced intent to enroll. While our analyses indicated payments
from carbon sequestration programs are not currently competitive with the monetary returns
expected from timber harvest or property sales, certain forest owners might see payments for
carbon sequestration programs as a viable option for offsetting increasing tax costs as development
encroaches and property values rise.

Keywords: stated choice methods; urbanization; payments for ecosystem services
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1

3
4
5

Introduction
Across the United States, forest and agricultural landscapes are becoming increasingly

6

fragmented as urban populations grow and cities expand (Theobald 2005; Theobald 2001;

7

Theobald and Romme 2007). The fragmentation of urban-proximate forest and agricultural

8

landscapes can have both immediate and long-term effects on natural systems. Immediate

9

impacts include the displacement of wildlife as habitat degrades as well as reductions in water

10

quality as erosion increases due to the direct removal of above-ground biomass (Hansen et al.

11

2005; Paul and Meyer 2001). The long-term environmental impacts of urban-proximate

12

landscape fragmentation are more difficult to observe. The loss of endemic plant and animal

13

species as well as biological diversity more generally, may only be realized after urbanization is

14

well underway (Theobald, Miller, and Hobbs 1997). Similarly, alterations to natural or semi-

15

natural hydrologic systems (primarily as a result of increased water use) may impact the ability

16

of ecological systems to respond to drought and climate-related stressors (Allan 2004). In

17

response to these direct impacts and long-term feedbacks, urban planners, forest managers and

18

agricultural associations are actively seeking out and exploring viable policies and programs that

19

conserve forest and agricultural landscapes and maintain the ecosystem services they provide

20

(Gobster, Stewart, and Bengston 2004).

21

Payments for ecosystem services policies are one of many potential policy options to

22

slow the rate of land use conversion in urbanizing areas (Bengston, Fletcher, and Nelson 2004;

23

Salzman 2005). Payments for ecosystem services can provide non-industrial private forest

24

owners a financial incentive to conserve or manage their land for the production of a valued
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25

ecosystem service like sequestering carbon from the atmosphere, maintaining water quality or

26

conserving wildlife habitat (Jack, Kousky, and Sims 2008; Engel, Pagiola, and Wunder 2008).

27

Simply put, payments for ecosystem services programs are policy instruments which require

28

individuals (typically landowners) to engage in a specific land management practice that: 1)

29

comes at a personal cost (which can include opportunity costs); and 2) results in the continued or

30

enhanced production of an ecological service that benefits society (Shelley 2011). As a note, we

31

use the terminology ‘payments for ecosystem services’ given it connotes the Millennium

32

Ecosystem Assessment’s simple definition of ‘ecosystem services’ as “the benefits people obtain

33

from ecosystems” (2003, 3). Interested readers are referred to Shelley (2011) and Derissen and

34

Latacz-Lohmann (2013) for substantive reviews of the terminology used to describe these types

35

of policy instruments.

36

Payments for carbon sequestration policies are particularly attractive mechanisms

37

because they often do not require intensive investments of either time or money from the forest

38

owner, allowing the forest owner to benefit financially from non-intensive management

39

strategies (Bigsby 2009; Lippke and Perez-Garcia 2008). Payments for carbon sequestration

40

policies may be especially appealing in the United States where most non-industrial private

41

forest owners do not actively manage their property through a forest management plan. Just 4%

42

of non-industrial private forest owners in the United States have a written management plan and

43

only 14% have ever sought out professional advice about their woodlands (Butler 2008). Other

44

potential policy solutions such as cost-share programs have not been widely adopted, presumably

45

because they are designed to supplement the forest products industry and often stipulate forest

46

owners actively manage their woodlands for timber extraction (Kilgore et al. 2007); only 6% of
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non-industrial private forest owners in the United States have ever participated in a cost-share

48

program (Butler 2008).

49

3

Aside from the appeal of not being directly tied to the forest products industry, payments

50

for carbon sequestration policies might also be attractive to forest owners because they align

51

directly with non-timber values (Bengston, Asah, and Butler 2010). Over the past 45 years, the

52

nonuse and noneconomic values private forest owners’ ascribe to their woodlands have become

53

stronger (Bengston, Asah, and Butler 2010). Urban residents in particular, tend to hold the

54

strongest nonuse forest values (Tarrant, Cordell, and Green 2003). Additionally, the average age

55

of the non-industrial private forest owner in the United States is declining as older forest owners

56

either sell their properties for development or transfer them to their children (Butler 2008). The

57

growing body of research on the shifting values of non-industrial private forest owners suggests

58

younger generations who inherit land have very strong psychological attachments to their

59

properties (Bliss and Martin 1989; Creighton, Blatner, and Carroll 2015; Gordon, Barton, and

60

Adams 2013; BenDor et al. 2014). The strong meanings forest owners tie to their properties is

61

likely an important factor affecting decisions about how they manage their land. Logically, the

62

stronger the psychological meanings a forest owner has towards their woodlands, the less likely

63

they would be to sell; conversely, the more likely they would be to enroll in a program allowing

64

them to manage their land in a low-intensity yet financially-beneficial way.

65

Aim and Objectives

66

Despite the anticipated benefits associated with payments for carbon sequestration

67

policies, only a few studies have explicitly examined the willingness of forest owners in

68

urbanizing regions to enroll in voluntary payments for carbon sequestration programs (Fletcher,

69

Kittredge, and Stevens 2009; Dickinson et al. 2012; Markowski-Lindsay et al. 2011). Recent
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related research has been conducted on forest owners’ attitudes towards carbon sequestration

71

programs (Khanal et al. 2016). In this study we explored individuals’ willingness to enroll in a

72

voluntary payments for carbon sequestration program through the use of a discrete choice

73

experiment delivered to non-industrial private forest owners living in the rapidly urbanizing

74

region surrounding Charlotte, North Carolina (USA). Specifically, we examined forest owners’

75

willingness to adopt payments for carbon sequestration policies that varied in their financial

76

incentives (i.e., annual payments), contract length requirements and type of administration (e.g.,

77

private companies versus a state or federal agency). Given payments for carbon sequestration

78

programs may be more appealing to individuals who ascribe strong personal meanings to their

79

forestland, we also examined the influence forest owners’ ‘sense of place’ has on their

80

willingness to enroll in a program. Our analysis was guided by four distinct hypotheses, each of

81

which is grounded in the literature, these are:

82
83
84
85
86

4

H1: Financial incentives will positively influence individuals’ intent to enroll in payments
for carbon sequestration programs.
H2: Contract length will negatively influence individuals’ intent to enroll in payments for
carbon sequestration programs.
H3: The type of organization (federal agency, state agency or a private company)

87

administering a payments for carbon sequestration program, will not influence

88

individuals’ intent to enroll in payments for carbon sequestration programs.

89

H4: There will be a positive relationship between individuals’ sense of place toward their

90

forested land and their intent to enroll in payments for carbon sequestration

91

programs.
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In addition to explicitly testing these hypotheses, we used data collected from site visits

93

to respondents’ properties to estimate those properties’ development and timber value; these

94

values were compared against the financial returns that would be realized if the forest owner

95

were to enroll in the hypothetical programs described in the discrete choice experiment. Our

96

intent is to see how a hypothetical carbon market compares to current timber and development

97

markets that are driving land use conversion throughout the region.

98
99
100
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Literature Review
Forest Owners’ Intent to Enroll in Payments for Carbon Sequestration Programs
There is a growing body of research that has examined the willingness of private forest

101

owners to participate in payments for carbon sequestration programs using discrete choice

102

methods. Previous research has predominantly focused on the northern Atlantic and Midwestern

103

states (Table 1), we were unable to identify any research on the preferences for carbon

104

sequestration program attributes in the Southeastern United States.

105

Existing research focused on the willingness of private forest owners to participate in

106

carbon sequestration programs has assessed the relative influence of different program attributes

107

on willingness to participate. Fletcher et al. (2009) assessed the willingness of seventeen

108

Massachusetts private forest owners to sequester carbon on their forestland based on six

109

hypothetical programs. In their study, program attributes such as expected payment per acre ($5,

110

$15 or $30), length of contract (5 or 10 years), penalty for early withdrawal and the requirement

111

to have a forest management plan in place were evaluated. The results suggested contract length,

112

expected payment per acre and early withdrawal penalties were significant determinants of

113

program participation. Similar results were identified in a related study by Dickinson et al.

114

(2012) which estimated participation of Massachusetts private forest owners across three
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115

hypothetical carbon sequestration programs. The program attributes examined included: contract

116

length (5, 10 or 15 years), financial incentives ($5, $15 or $30 per acre annual revenue), the

117

requirement for a forest management plan to be in place and the stipulation of a penalty for early

118

withdrawal from the program. The results indicated per acre annual revenue was a positive

119

predictor of program enrollment, while contract length, the requirement to have a forest

120

management plan in place and the stipulation of a penalty for early withdrawal were all

121

negatively related to forest owners’ intent to enroll. In another study investigating the intentions

122

of Massachusetts forest owners to participate in payments for carbon sequestration programs,

123

Markowski-Lindsay et al. (2011) found shorter contracts (15 years), higher payments ($1000 per

124

acre per year), the ability to withdraw from the program without penalty and not being required

125

to have a forest management plan in place were positive predictors of program enrollment. The

126

authors note that financial incentives (annual revenue per acre) were very inelastic (i.e., the

127

intent to enroll did not change much as the incentive price increased or decreased, Png 2012).

128

The inelasticity of financial incentives suggests forest owners’ participation is likely dependent

129

upon other factors. Markowski-Lindsay et al.’s (2011) study determined the overall probability

130

of enrollment in payments for carbon sequestration programs for Massachusetts forest owners

131

was less than 38%, even when desirable attributes were maximized and undesirable attributes

132

were minimized.

133

Other studies have examined the influence of program attributes associated with

134

payments for other ecosystem services, aside from carbon sequestration (Rabotyagov and Lin

135

2013; Knoot, Rickenbach, and Silbernagel 2015; Kelly, Germain, and Stehman 2015). Knoot et

136

al. (2015) investigated the effect of four cumulative requirement levels (i.e., no requirements,

137

management plan, practices and inspection) and their impact on Wisconsin forest owners’
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138

willingness to participate in programs that offered payments for the provisioning of three

139

ecosystem services: bird habitat, carbon sequestration and water quality. Their results revealed

140

requirements involving more commitment deterred participation; participation rates dropped

141

from 42% when no requirements were stipulated to 18% when all of the aforementioned land

142

management practices were required. Knoot et al. (2015) also found that program administration

143

(government or market) held no significant influence on participation across all requirement

144

levels. This is inconsistent with findings from stakeholder focus groups in the Charlotte

145

metropolitan region, which indicated strong anti-government sentiment that could affect forest

146

owners’ receptivity to government administered programs in our study area (BenDor et al. 2014).

147

Similarly, Kelly et al. (2015) assessed the likelihood of New York forest owners to enroll in

148

various payments for forest conservation programs. The payments for conservation programs

149

received an average enrollment of 8% regardless of time commitment. However, financial

150

incentives (annual payment levels) and management plan requirements were significant

151

attributes affecting enrollment. In another similar study, Rabotyagov and Lin (2013) explored the

152

preferences for attributes of working forest conservation contracts among Washington forest

153

owners. Of the three program attributes investigated, contract length significantly influenced the

154

likelihood of program participation. Finally, through focus groups with Forest Guild members,

155

Wade and Moseley (2011) found profitability to be the greatest barrier to private forest owners’

156

enrollment in voluntary payments for carbon sequestration programs. Financial incentives

157

positively affecting enrollment rates is a consistent finding across the literature.

158

Psychological and Sociodemographic Factors Influencing Program Enrollment

159
160

Aside from the attributes associated with payments for carbon sequestration programs,
forest owners’ psychological attachments to their property might affect their intent to enroll
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161

(Markowski-Lindsay et al. 2011). However, no previous study has explicitly and empirically

162

examined this relationship. ‘Sense of place’ is a positive bond between individuals and their

163

environment, based on affect, cognition and symbolic meanings (Stedman 2002). Several studies

164

suggest the sense of place that an individual forest owner has towards their property will affect

165

how they manage that property (Lai and Kreuter 2012; Lokocz, Ryan, and Sadler 2011).

166

Lai and Kreuter (2012) examined how ‘place attachment’ (a construct very similar to

167

sense of place) influenced Texas landowners’ intent to retain their land and engage in

168

conservation behaviors. Much like the forest owners near Charlotte in our study, the landowners

169

examined in Lai and Kreuter’s study were facing development pressure from the nearby cities of

170

Austin and San Antonio. Landowners living in the Hill Country region adjacent to the

171

metropolitan areas surrounding both of these cities indicated a strong intent to keep their

172

property in the family. Land owners’ attachments to their personal properties, as well as their

173

perceptions of environmental change throughout the region, were significantly and positively

174

related to the intent to retain their properties. In addition, landowners who indicated they were

175

either heavily dependent upon, or attached a lot of social meanings to, their properties were

176

willing to invest more in conservation-oriented land management strategies.

177

Relatedly, Lokocz et al. (2011) utilized photo-elicitation methods to examine how rural

178

Massachusetts residents’ psychological attachments to local landscape features influenced their

179

attitudes toward conservation and land use planning. Participants in the study indicated a high

180

level of attachment towards natural areas (consisting of forests, streams, ponds and meadows)

181

and the majority of participants showed strong support for protecting local woodlands and

182

natural resources. The study’s qualitative methods illustrate how the strong, personally
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meaningful connections an individual has towards local and familiar landscapes can shape

184

support for conservation-oriented land use planning efforts.

185

9

In addition to sense of place and place attachment, Thompson and Hansen (2013; 2012)

186

identified other psychological, cultural and social factors likely to influence individuals’

187

willingness to participate in payments for carbon sequestration programs. These factors included

188

landowners’ values, their ecological knowledge, the risk they associate with encroaching

189

development, as well as their willingness to communicate and learn about payments for carbon

190

sequestration programs.

191
192
193

Methods
Study Region
This study focused on the area surrounding Charlotte, North Carolina (USA) (Figure 1).

194

Since the 1980s the city and its surrounding metropolitan region have experienced rapid

195

population growth characterized by disjunct, low-density development (Meentemeyer et al.

196

2013). Urban development throughout the region has come at the expense of forest and

197

agricultural lands, and growth projections for the region suggest more than 210,000 ha of

198

forested and agricultural land will be converted to development by the year 2030 if observed

199

trends between 1996 and 2006 continue (Meentemeyer et al. 2013). The majority of forested land

200

throughout the region is owned by non-industrial private forest owners, and these holdings tend

201

to be relatively small (< 10 ha), which limits forest owners’ ability to financially benefit from

202

either harvesting timber or biomass (Dorning, Smith, et al. 2015). Past research in the region

203

suggests forest owners are concerned with rising property taxes and the lack of tax-relief policies

204

focused on conserving forested lands; this concern is compounded by strong emotional and

205

psychological ties to the region’s culturally rich landscapes (BenDor et al. 2014). Currently,
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there are no established policies that provide non-industrial private forest owners with an

207

opportunity to benefit financially from conserving or managing their woodlands (North Carolina

208

Department of Revenue 2015). The region does have a present-use value program that allows

209

land to be valued based upon its use for forestry or agriculture, which is substantially less than its

210

development value. However, not all forested land throughout the region qualifies for the

211

present-use value program. The program requires forest owners to own at least 20 acres (8.09

212

hectares) and have a forest management plan in place that allows timber harvesting. These

213

requirements limit the ability of the present-use value program to be an indirect tool capable of

214

slowing urban growth. Given this, other more direct land use policies need to be explored. It is

215

possible a regional carbon sequestration market could allow forest owners the ability to benefit

216

financially from conserving or managing their woodlands while maintaining their strong

217

emotional and psychological connections to their properties.

218

Discrete Choice Experimental Design

219

We developed a discrete choice experiment to explore contingent forest owner behaviors

220

in response to hypothetical payments for carbon sequestration programs. Stated choice methods

221

are commonly used to understand individuals’ behavioral responses to hypothetical choices

222

(Louviere, Hensher, and Swait 2000). Our goal was to understand which factors exhibit the most

223

influence on forest owners’ behavioral intentions, including the attributes of the payment

224

program as well as individual psychological and sociodemographic factors. Our analysis was

225

guided by a desire to better understand if, and how, the attributes of the payment program alterd

226

forest owners’ preferences for those programs. Our intent was not to estimate a willingness to

227

accept value for all of the non-financial attributes of payments programs, rather we were

228

primarily interested in taking advantage of the methodological benefits of discrete choice
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experiments (i.e., requiring respondents to cognitively evaluates specific trade-offs among

230

program attributes (Hanley, Mourato, and Wright 2001)) to develop a better understanding of the

231

program attributes forest owners considered important when contemplating enrolling in a

232

payments for carbon sequestration program.

233

Econometric Model of Contingent Behavior. In trying to understand the likelihood that

234

private forest owners would enroll in payments for carbon sequestration programs, we were

235

specifically interested in whether or not financial incentives, contract lengths and program

236

administration influences individuals’ contingent behaviors. These three factors were combined

237

and varied across meaningful ranges to create a suite of hypothetical, yet realistic, payments for

238

carbon sequestration programs. For each program, forest owners were asked to carefully consider

239

the combination of attributes being presented and make a “yes/no” choice as to whether or not

240

they would participate in the program. A “yes” response indicates forest owners derive more

241

utility from participating in the program than they would otherwise. Utility formulation for each

242

binary discrete choice made in response to a hypothetical program follows the random utility

243

framework (McFadden 1973). Across an entire set of choices, j, and a sample of individuals, i,

244

the linear equation used to estimate random and explainable (systematic) utility is expressed as

245
246

𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝑉𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽′𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 .

247
248

The explainable (systematic) utilities 𝑉𝑖𝑗 are a function of the design matrix 𝑋, which represents

249

attributes presented in various combinations across the choice set. The 𝛽′ coefficients are

250

estimated for each attribute.
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Scenario Development, Attributes and Levels. To elicit the most valid responses, the

252

survey instrument included a narrative frame describing the general characteristics of payments

253

for carbon sequestration programs and how they could be implemented in the study region.

254

Following the narrative framing statement, forest owners were asked to evaluate a set of nine

255

possible payments for carbon sequestration programs and, for each program, to carefully

256

consider its attributes and indicate whether or not they would participate in the program.

257

Respondents were also given an opt out response option to avoid the likelihood of a forest owner

258

providing a response if they felt uninformed or unqualified to make a decision (Banzhaf,

259

Johnson, and Mathews 2001; Kontoleon and Yabe 2003). The choice set was comprised of

260

various combinations of the three key attributes: financial incentives, contract lengths and

261

program administration. Each of these three attributes were varied across three levels; the levels

262

were set to encompass realistic ranges based upon previous research and consultation with

263

experts in the region’s potential for a carbon sequestration market. The full narrative frame and

264

choice set are shown in Figure 2; individual attributes and their specified levels are noted in

265

Table 1. The narrative was developed such that it clearly described the essential components of a

266

payments for ecosystem services program, as outlined by Engel et al. (2008). These essential

267

components are: 1) an explicit description of the type of land being conserved and the ecosystem

268

service it provides; 2) the ability of enrollees in the program to terminate the contractual

269

relationship; and 3) the establishment of a monitoring system (in our case a written forest

270

management plan that required conservation) in order to ensure payments are the result of

271

additional land management activities. Given payments for ecosystem services programs often

272

fail to demonstrate additionality, producing more of a given ecosystem service than would have

273

been produced without the program, we attempted to make it as clear and as explicit as possible
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that the payments would not be “money for nothing” (Engel, Pagiola, and Wunder 2008; Ferraro

275

and Pattanayak 2006).

276

With three attributes, each presented at one of three levels in any given program, there

277

were a total of 27 possible combinations to represent different carbon sequestration programs.

278

Given it was deemed too burdensome to have each forest owner consider and respond to all 27

279

combinations, we opted for a fractional factorial design comprised of nine combinations (i.e.,

280

hypothetical payments for carbon sequestration programs). All sampled forest owners received

281

the same choice set of nine possible carbon sequestration programs.

282

Variables Used in Econometric Model

283

A summary of all variables used in the econometric modeling is provided in Table 2.

284

Respondents’ sociodemographic characteristics were captured through the first mail-back survey.

285

Specifically, we collected data on forest owners’ age, gender, education and income. We also

286

collected data on the amount of time the forest owner has spent on the property (presence); this

287

was calculated as the total years of ownership multiplied by the number of days they spend on

288

the property per year. The first mail-back survey also ascertained whether or not respondents had

289

a forest management plan in place (management plan present) and whether they currently

290

harvested timber for income on their property (harvest for income).

291

The first mail-back survey was also used to measure forest owners’ psychological

292

connections to forested areas on their properties. We used Jorgensen and Stedman’s (2006)

293

psychometric scale, modifying each statement so that it referred explicitly to respondents’

294

forested property. Data obtained via the 5-point Likert scale were analyzed for reliability

295

(Cronbach’s  greater than 0.70 were deemed acceptable following Nunnally and Bernstein

296

1994), adequate factor loadings (loadings greater than 0.60 were deemed acceptable following
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Hair et al. 2009) and their fit to a hypothesized single-factor measurement model (relative 2

298

values less than 3.0 were deemed acceptable following Carmines and McIver 1981). With these

299

criteria satisfied, a single sense of place factor score was calculated for inclusion in the mixed

300

effects logistic regression model described below. This method is identical to that used in

301

previous analyses of these data (Dorning, Smith, et al., 2015).

302

Other variables included in the model were derived from either the analysis of satellite

303

imagery/LiDAR data or publically available property tax records. Specific measures included the

304

size of the forest stand on the respondent’s property estimated via satellite imagery (forest size)

305

and the appraised value of the parcel extracted from 2011 tax records (economic value). Very

306

few stated choice experiments have used biophysical variables derived via remote sensing as

307

factors influencing forest owners’ decisions; exceptions include the work of Naidoo and

308

Adamowicz (2005) and Dorning and her colleagues (2015).

309

Econometric Model Specification

310

We used a mixed effects logistic regression specification to estimate the probability that

311

forest owners would participate in payments for carbon sequestration programs depending upon

312

the level of attributes presented. The mixed effects logistic regression is a flexible specification

313

that can approximate any random utility model (McFadden and Train 2000). The mixed effects

314

logistic regression specification decomposes random error into two components; the first

315

component is correlated over alternatives and heteroskedastic while the second part is assumed

316

to be independently and identically distributed over alternatives and individuals (McFadden

317

1984). This is noteworthy because individuals’ responses within the choice set are likely to be

318

highly correlated. Preferences and subsequently utility functions will vary between individuals;

319

the mixed effects specification accommodates this and is commonly used to overcome the
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limitations of standard logit and conditional logit specifications (McFadden and Train 2000). Our

321

model is specified as:

322
323

𝑃𝑟(𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 1) = 𝜇 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑗 +

324

𝛽3 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽4 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 +

325

𝛽8 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽9 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽10 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽11 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 +

326

𝛽12 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽13 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 .

327
328

The model posits the probability of enrolling in payments for carbon sequestration programs is a

329

function of the program’s attributes, an individual’s sociodemographic characteristics and the

330

characteristics of their property. Estimation was completed using dummy variable coding for

331

attribute levels and the meqrlogit command in Stata 14.0 (StataCorp 2015).

332

Data Collection

333

Data on forest owners and their contingent enrollment in hypothetical payments for

334

carbon sequestration programs were collected via two self-administered mail-back surveys. We

335

sent surveys to a sample of forest owners in a five-county region on the eastern side of Charlotte,

336

an extent characterizing the region’s full development gradient. We drew a sample of 2,500

337

landowners from a sampling frame comprised of private forest owners within the five-county

338

study area; forest owner names and addresses were obtained from publically available tax

339

records. The sample consisted of forest owners who owned more than 2 ha of contiguous forest

340

(determined via analysis of both 2011 Landsat and LiDAR data (Singh et al. 2012)). The initial

341

sample of forest owners were asked to agree to an on-site ecological assessment and timber

342

cruise of their property and, subsequently, to complete two mail-back surveys; a total of 143
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(5.7%) forest owners agreed. The first mail-back survey was administered from November 2011

344

to April 2012; it asked about forest owners’ sociodemographic characteristics, how they

345

managed woodlands on their property as well as their psychological attachment to their property.

346

A total of 126 out of the 143 woodland owners (88%) completed this first mail-back survey. The

347

second mail-back survey was administered in November 2013 to the 126 forest owners who

348

responded to the first survey. The second mail-back survey was substantially shorter than the

349

first, containing only a series of stated preference questions related to the forest owners’

350

willingness to participate in payments for carbon sequestration programs. A total of 65 forest

351

owners, out of the 126 who received the second mail-back survey, completed and returned the

352

instrument. This tabulates out to a 49.6% response rate, which is high relative to most mail

353

surveys administered to either the general public or forest owners (Dillman, Smyth, and

354

Christian 2008). Five respondents indicated their property had been sold since they responded to

355

the first mail-back survey two years earlier. All results presented in this study are for the

356

remaining 60 forest owners and their properties.

357

Both survey packets mailed to respondents included a personalized map with an aerial

358

photo of forested land on the respondents’ property. In a cover letter, we asked forest owners to

359

respond to the questions in reference to the forested land shown on the map, excluding from

360

consideration other forested areas they might have owned. These explicit instructions were

361

included to make responses and contingent decisions personally meaningful.

362
363

Results
The characteristics of our sample of forest owners and their properties are reported in

364

Table 2. The majority of respondents (71.7%) were men and the mean age was 64.2 (SD = 11.2).

365

All respondents had graduated from high school, with the majority (68.3%) also having a
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bachelor’s degree. Respondents’ properties ranged in size from one to fifty-one hectares, with an

367

average size of 6.9 hectares (SD = 8.4). On average, respondents indicated owning their

368

forestland for at least twenty years (M = 20.4, SD = 12.8); this varied widely however, with

369

length of ownership ranging from two to fifty-eight years. The majority of respondents (68.3%)

370

lived on or within a half-mile of the forested property.

371

The average size of respondents’ forests was 6.9 hectares (SD = 8.4) and the assessed tax

372

value of their entire property was just under $400 thousand USD. However, both the size of

373

respondents’ forest stands and the value of their properties varied widely (Table 2), mitigating

374

some of the concern over coverage error given the relatively small sample. Only a relatively

375

small proportion (18.3%) of our sample reported harvesting timber to generate income and just

376

under one-third (31.7%) reported having a management plan in place.

377

When queried about the sense of place respondents had towards their forested property,

378

respondents on average reported strong personal meanings (Table 3). For example, 77.2% of

379

sampled forest owners indicated moderate or complete agreement with the statement “I feel

380

relaxed when I’m on my wooded land.” Similarly, 62.5% of the sample indicated moderate or

381

complete agreement with the statement “I feel happiest when I’m on my wooded land.”

382

The results from the hierarchical mixed effects logistic regression model, which predicted

383

forest owners’ intent to enroll in payments for carbon sequestration programs, are shown in

384

Table 4. The model’s estimates can be interpreted as the welfare of each attribute’s level. For the

385

non-price attributes (contract length and program administration) and the price attribute (per acre

386

annual payment), increases (decreases) in welfare are indicated by positive (negative) values.

387
388

The results revealed annual payment levels do significantly influence individuals’
likelihood of enrolling. The odds of a forest owner enrolling in a payments for carbon
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sequestration program were 18.5 times higher if that program yielded $25 per acre annual

390

payments as opposed to $5 per acre annual payments (Coef. = 2.917, p < 0.001). More notably,

391

the odds of a forest owner enrolling in a payments for carbon sequestration program were nearly

392

110 times greater if the program resulted in $50 per acre annual payments instead of $5 per acre

393

annual payments (Coef. = 4.702, p < 0.001). These results supported our proposed hypothesis

394

(H1) that financial incentives would positively influence individuals’ intent to enroll in payments

395

for carbon sequestration programs.

396

The results also revealed contract length significantly influences individuals’ likelihood

397

of enrolling, with respondents preferring shorter contracts (15-year contract, Coef. = -2.266, p <

398

0.001; 30-year contract, Coef. = -4.855, p < 0.001). While contract length was significant, its

399

influence was marginal relative to the effect of annual payment levels, which exhibited a very

400

strong signal. This result supported our proposed hypothesis (H2) that contract length would

401

negatively influence individuals’ intent to enroll in payments for carbon sequestration programs.

402

The final attribute of the hypothetical programs, the type of agency administering the

403

program, was not significantly related to individuals’ intent to enroll (Administered by a state

404

agency: Coef. = 0.451, p = 0.266; Administered by a federal agency: Coef. = 0.613, p = 0.291).

405

This result followed our proposed hypothesis (H 3) that the type of organization administering a

406

payments for carbon sequestration program would not influence individuals’ intent to enroll.

407

The results also suggested forest owners’ education level and income influenced their

408

intent to enroll in payments for carbon sequestration programs. Forest owners who had obtained

409

a higher level of formal education were significantly more likely to enroll in a program,

410

regardless of program characteristics (Coef. = 0.597, p < 0.045). Additionally, wealthier

411

individuals were significantly less likely to enroll in a program, regardless of program
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characteristics (Coef. = -0.286, p < 0.082). None of the other characteristics describing forest

413

owners (age, gender, presence on the property or sense of place) were significantly related to

414

their intent to enroll in a program. The finding of no significant relationship between forest

415

owners’ sense of place towards their forested property and their willingness to enroll that

416

property in a payments for carbon sequestration program was dissimilar to our proposed

417

hypothesis of a positive relationship (H4).

418

None of the characteristics of forest owners’ property (size of forest stand, the presence

419

of a management plan, whether or not timber was harvested for income generation or economic

420

(property) value) were significant predictors of the forest owners’ intent to enroll in payments for

421

carbon sequestration programs.

422

We began this investigation by posing the question “Can a payments for carbon

423

sequestration program alleviate development pressure in a rapidly urbanizing region?” We

424

formally addressed this question by calculating the annual revenue generated by each of the

425

hypothetical payments for carbon sequestration programs for each forest owner. For each forest

426

owner i and each discrete choice opportunity c, this is

427
428

𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑐 = 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑐 × 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐 .

429
430

The average initial annual revenue required to elicit an intent to enroll response varied widely,

431

from $51 per acre for policies guaranteeing a $5 per acre annual payment, to $753 per acre for

432

policies guaranteeing a $50 annual payment. After calculating all of the initial annual revenues

433

for the choice opportunities in which a forest owner indicated an intent to enroll, we applied an

434

annual discount rate of 4% across the hypothetical contracts’ lengths to account for the time
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value of cash according to Folmer et al. (1995). This allowed us to arrive at a total discounted

436

contract length revenue value. Our calculation was based on the assumption annual revenue

437

would be received beginning in the second year of enrollment. The variation in intent to enroll

438

prices was even more evident when viewed over the life of the contract; average discounted

439

contract length revenue ranged from $190 per acre for the $5 per acre policies to $8,540 for the

440

$50 per acre policies.

441

We estimated the years of enrollment that would be required for respondents to receive

442

equal returns from a payments for carbon sequestration program relative to returns they would

443

receive from either cutting all of their forest for timber or selling it at its current (2014) market

444

value; the results are shown in Table 5. If a payments for carbon sequestration program were

445

available that yielded the maximum $50 per acre annual return over a 15-year contract length,

446

forest owners would not be able to generate an equivalent amount of revenue from the program,

447

even if they enrolled for two consecutive contracts (years of enrollment to match timber value =

448

38.4). This result suggests that even under the highest-return option and a relatively long

449

contract-length program, a payments for carbon sequestration program would not be an attractive

450

alternative to either selling property for development or harvesting for timber. As can be seen in

451

column 6 of Table 5 the years of enrollment required to equal their properties’ current market

452

value is well beyond any planning time frame (i.e., 600 to > 13,000 years). Obviously there are a

453

variety of factors that affect forest owners’ decisions to sell their property for development or

454

harvest it for timber production; the purpose here is to compare the options purely on their

455

financial returns.

456
457

Discussion
Policy Implications

PAYMENTS FOR C SEQUESTRATION TO ALLEVIATE DEVELOPMENT PRESSURE 21
458

As exurban development spreads across landscapes, large contiguous tracts of forest have

459

become increasingly fragmented, threatening the ecosystem services they provide (Theobald

460

2005; Theobald 2001; Theobald and Romme 2007). Payments for ecosystem service programs,

461

and payments for carbon sequestration in particular, provide a mechanism through which

462

regional planners and policy makers can conserve urban-proximate forestlands and the

463

ecosystem services they provide by allowing private forest owners to benefit financially from not

464

selling their land for development or harvesting for timber production (Bigsby 2009). Alternative

465

policy mechanisms, such as the procurement and conservation of private forestland by a public

466

or not-for-profit organization, can also alleviate development pressure (Newburn et al. 2005).

467

However, transferring land from the private to public domain is only likely to occur near highly

468

valued resources such as riparian areas, simply pushing development pressures to other areas

469

around a metropolitan region (Dorning, Koch, et al. 2015). Additionally, the efficient transfer of

470

private land to the public-domain requires complex payment and/or transfer options capable of

471

meeting the needs of different types of private landowners (e.g., rural residents, farmers, forest

472

owners) (Nielsen-Pincus, Ribe, and Johnson 2015). Payments for carbon sequestration programs

473

offer a flexible policy alternative, allowing forest owners the ability to continue living on their

474

properties while simultaneously receiving an annual payment for the carbon being sequestered

475

and stored in their forest stands.

476

While payments for carbon sequestration programs are attractive policy mechanisms at a

477

conceptual level, their implementation has been severely limited by the lack of regional carbon

478

markets (Newell, Pizer, and Raimi 2013). In the United States, the voluntary Chicago Climate

479

Exchange (CCX) served as the primary outlet for such programs while in operation from 2003 to

480

2011. Currently, there are only two active regional markets, California and the Regional
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Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in the northeastern portion of the country (Center for Climate

482

and Energy Solutions 2016). These markets establish the price per ton of carbon sequestered

483

based upon industries’ need to offset emissions and private forest owners’ willingness to manage

484

their forests for carbon sequestration. In this research, we leveraged the ability of discrete choice

485

experiments to determine if a payments for carbon sequestration program could succeed in the

486

southeastern United States, where exurban forest owners are highly attached to their private

487

lands and consequently may be more willing to opt into payments for carbon sequestration

488

programs at a discounted rate, if it means their forest will remain intact.

489

On many points, our results echoed the findings of previous research. Our sample of

490

forest owners expressed a relatively limited interest in enrolling in payments for carbon

491

sequestration programs. Even when presented with a very large annual payment of $50 per acre,

492

only 45.8% of respondents indicated an intent to enroll; this proportion declined as annual

493

payments were reduced and contract lengths were extended. This result is consistent with

494

previous research (Fletcher, Kittredge, and Stevens 2009; Markowski-Lindsay et al. 2011;

495

Miller, Snyder, and Kilgore 2012; Miller et al. 2014) and perhaps expected given most private

496

forest owners in the United States are passive managers. We had expected a higher level of

497

interest in payments for carbon sequestration programs given a recent region-wide study found

498

non-industrial private forest owners to be generally receptive to payments for carbon

499

sequestration programs (Khanal et al. 2016). Khanal and his colleagues found 30% of a sample

500

of non-industrial forest owners from across the Southeastern US agreed with the statement

501

“carbon sequestration could generate additional revenue for me”; only 11% of the sample

502

disagreed with the statement. Similarly, 45% of the sample indicated they were “interested in
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exploring carbon sequestration opportunities on [their] forestland”; only 12% were not

504

interested.

505

Our sample’s low level of interest in enrolling in payments for carbon sequestration

506

programs is likely attributable to a variety of factors. First, they are likely to have a limited

507

knowledge of the ‘ecosystem services’ concept and, relatedly, are likely to know very little about

508

how carbon markets would actually work in practice (Metz and Weigel 2010). Given this, it is

509

logical for forest owners to be hesitant about making, or even indicating their preferences for,

510

decisions related to the long-term use of their property. More focused research, particularly

511

research using multiple types of data (i.e., quantitative and qualitative), needs to be conducted to

512

determine if a lack of knowledge and familiarity are in fact major barriers to forest owners’

513

intent to enroll in emerging carbon markets. Second, through the use of a stated choice

514

experiment, our study required forest owners to carefully consider their forested property and

515

what the consequences of each hypothetical policy scenario would be for themselves and their

516

property. Previous research may have over-estimated forest owners’ interest in carbon

517

sequestrations programs due to the fact simple statement items presented in mail-back

518

questionnaires are context-deficient and do not require forest owners to carefully consider the

519

details and consequences of their land-use decisions (Khanal et al. 2016).

520

When our sample of forest owners did indicate an intent to enroll, their preferences were

521

influenced by the financial returns yielded by the program as well as its length. Respondents had

522

strong preferences for programs yielding higher returns, which is logical and consistent with all

523

previous empirical research (Fletcher, Kittredge, and Stevens 2009; Dickinson et al. 2012;

524

Markowski-Lindsay et al. 2011; Rabotyagov and Lin 2013; Knoot, Rickenbach, and Silbernagel

525

2015; Kelly, Germain, and Stehman 2015; Miller, Snyder, and Kilgore 2012; Miller et al. 2014).
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The majority of previous research has also found non-industrial private forest owners tend to be

527

hesitant to make long-term decisions committing them to managing their forestlands in any one

528

particular way (Dickinson et al. 2012; Markowski-Lindsay et al. 2011; Newell, Pizer, and Raimi

529

2013; Miller, Snyder, and Kilgore 2012; Miller et al. 2014). This unfortunately does not bode

530

well for the prospect of establishing a regional payments for carbon sequestration market within

531

the study area. At the high point of the CCX (trading price of $7.50 per metric ton in 2008;

532

Climate Policy Initiative 2016)), the maximum potential payments in the Southeast would have

533

been around $15 per acre per year based on CCX’s estimated carbon sequestration rates across

534

all Southeastern forest types. Current rates for the RGGI are even lower though their reports

535

suggest prices are generally increasing over time, while trading prices in California are generally

536

a bit higher (Climate Policy Initiative 2016). These markets have required contracts of a

537

minimum of 15 years (CCX), with longer contracts (RGGI) sometimes required. Creation of a

538

market in the Southeast would require a critical mass of tradable carbon, in this case, a large pool

539

stored in private forests under long-term management contracts. For regional markets to be

540

successful, industries that might see them as viable mechanisms to offset emissions would need

541

some long-term assurances in the market’s stability. Absent that stability, alternative

542

mechanisms or alternative carbon markets (e.g. REDD+) are likely to be preferred.

543

We focused our survey on payments for carbon sequestration based on market prices for

544

similar markets in the U.S., though other carbon payment mechanisms do exist. Payments for

545

carbon storage, or avoided carbon release from deforestation, would likely provide much higher

546

payment rates than those for sequestration as forest owners would be compensated for the total

547

amount of carbon stored rather than incremental carbon sequestered. Additionally, estimates of

548

the social cost of carbon at $36 per metric ton (Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of
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Carbon 2013) far exceed the current value in most markets, bringing the potential payment level

550

up to $72 per acre per year for carbon sequestered in Southeastern forests if the true cost of

551

carbon were to be reflected in market prices (though Moore and Diaz (2015) argue the figure

552

should be much higher). Given the preference of forest owners for greater financial returns,

553

higher payment rates could increase the feasibility of carbon programs for alleviating

554

development pressure in urbanizing areas.

555

Despite the relative ambivalence of forest owners towards participating in payments for

556

carbon sequestration programs at current rates and their aversion to programs with longer

557

contract lengths, our results did identify some demographic groups that can be targeted as ‘early

558

adopters’ to pilot payments for carbon sequestration programs. Specifically, our results

559

suggested more educated individuals as well as individuals with smaller incomes were

560

significantly more likely to indicate intent to enroll relative to forest owners with fewer years of

561

formal education and wealthier individuals. These findings could be insightful for efficiently

562

targeting specific types of forest owners most likely to participate in a pilot payments for carbon

563

sequestration program, if one were initiated throughout the region. These findings can be used to

564

develop communication strategies targeted at specific forest owners that are most likely to enroll.

565

Given our findings suggest the populations most likely to enroll are those forest owners who are

566

more educated and who also have smaller annual incomes, the logical ‘target population’ would

567

be retirees looking to maintain the aesthetic appeal of their forested land while also having some

568

formal policy mechanism that would allow them to generate a cash-flow from their passive

569

ownership.

570
571

It is interesting to note forest owners’ sense of place was not significantly related to their
intent to enroll in payments for carbon sequestration programs. This is especially noteworthy
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given forest owners, on average, indicated strong personal meanings attached to their forested

573

property. Previous research into payments for ecosystem services programs suggests that when

574

the amount of the payment itself is marginal relative to landowners’ other sources of income (as

575

is the case in our study area), the larger the influence of other benefits such as maintaining a

576

desired aesthetic or family/cultural values tied to the land (Muradian et al. 2010). We can only

577

speculate as to why sense of place was not significantly related to forest owners’ willingness to

578

enroll, as anticipated. One possible explanation is that simply having the word ‘program’

579

attached may cause forest owners to wrongfully identify payments for carbon sequestration

580

programs with other more intensive programs, such as present use valuation programs. Simply

581

put, some forest owners may not associate payments for carbon sequestration programs with an

582

increased ability to maintain the non-market values they ascribe to their forested property,

583

marginalizing the true and expected relationship between the sense of place construct and

584

willingness to enroll. Payment may actually be viewed as undermining the intrinsic values the

585

forest owner wishes to protect (Muradian et al. 2013).

586

Limitations

587

Estimating the utilities associated with the attributes of hypothetical policies and

588

programs via stated choice methods is a difficult task for economists and other social scientists

589

who focus on human decision making. This difficulty comes from a variety of different sources

590

ranging from deciding which attributes define the hypothetical policy or program to establishing

591

a realistic range of values across which those attributes will vary in the choice set. Attributes and

592

levels selected should be both understandable (DeShazo and Fermo 2002) and relevant (Hensher

593

2006) to respondents. In this study, we attempted to meet both of these criteria through a detailed

594

review of previous research on the feasibility and costs associated with payments for carbon
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sequestration programs and consultation with several bioeconomists who were able to inform the

596

levels we chose to use for our annual payments per acre attribute. While we hope this

597

precautionary step increases the validity of our findings, there are undoubtedly a wide variety of

598

program characteristics (e.g., method of payment, compliance requirements, etc.) that also likely

599

to influence forest owners’ willingness to enroll in payments for carbon sequestration programs.

600

We were only able to focus on a small set of attributes within this study, but hope future research

601

will build upon our findings and the findings of similar work (Table 1).

602

Another difficulty in estimating the utilities associated with the attributes of hypothetical

603

policies and programs via stated choice programs is the proper analytical treatment of collected

604

data. Resource economists have gradually adapted more complex and sophisticated statistical

605

specifications, moving from the simple binary logit model to the multinomial logit model to the

606

conditional logit model and now the mixed effects logit model (Hensher and Greene 2002). With

607

the addition of each additional specification comes a new set of assumptions that analysts must

608

be wary of. Here, we used a mixed logit model with one random parameter, the individual, that

609

we specified as being normally distributed. Our specification is not analytically novel, but it does

610

mitigate all of the concerns raised by Hensher and Greene (2002). These concerns include:

611

appropriate selection of parameters to be included as random parameters, appropriate selection of

612

the distribution of the random parameters and appropriate specification of the way random

613

parameters enter the model. We felt the mixed logit specification was appropriate given it relaxes

614

independence of irrelevant alternatives property inherent in standard logit and conditional logit

615

models and subsequently allows response variable to be correlated across the choice situations

616

presented to each individual (Train 2009). Future work that chooses to used stated preference

617

data to estimate forest owners’ intent to enroll in payments for carbon sequestration programs,
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and chooses to fit those data with mixed effects logit specifications should be mindful of the

619

concerns detailed by Hensher and Greene (2002)

620

Conclusion

621

We began this investigation to determine forest owners’ willingness to enroll in a

622

payments for carbon sequestration market in an urbanizing region. In our study area surrounding

623

metropolitan Charlotte, the potential for market failure is high as urbanization is rapidly

624

consuming the landscape (Meentemeyer et al. 2013; Terando et al. 2014). Even if private forest

625

owners are committed to not developing their properties, they can benefit financially from stands

626

on their property by harvesting them for timber production. Both development and harvesting for

627

timber production are financially enticing, but dramatically alter the ecological function of the

628

landscape. While the majority of forest owners in our study were reluctant to indicate an intent to

629

enroll in payments for carbon sequestration programs, we did identify several groups of forest

630

owners likely to capitalize on the benefits provided by payments for ecosystem services

631

programs, namely the ability to receive annual revenue capable of offsetting rising property taxes

632

and the ability to maintain non-market values such as local aesthetics and recreation use values.

633

If a payments for carbon sequestration program could be combined with payments for other

634

ecosystem services such as water quality and wildlife habitat, it is possible these individuals

635

would be even more likely to see these ‘alternative’ forest management programs as viable

636

mechanisms from which they could benefit financially and maintain the strong personal

637

meanings they hold towards their forestlands. Programs could become even more attractive if

638

payments accounted for carbon already stored or the social cost of carbon. On a strategic level,

639

payments for carbon sequestration programs offer the promise of preserving local ecological
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structure and function while simultaneously enabling forest owners to benefit financially from

641

the public goods they provide to society.
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Table 1
Carbon sequestration program attributes and levels examined using stated choice methods in this, and previous, research
Attribute and Levels
Financial
incentives (annual
payment per acre
Contract
(USD))
length (yrs.)
Program administration
Geographic region of the United States
North
>5
≥ 25
Atlantic
to <
to <
≥
State
Federal
Private
and New
Northern
Pacific
Previous research
25
50
50
5
15
30
agency
agency
company
England
Midwest
Northwest
✓
Fletcher,
Kittredge, and
✓
✓
✓
Stevens 2009
✓
Dickinson et al.
✓
✓
✓
✓
2012
✓
MarkowskiLindsay et al.
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
2011
✓
Knoot,
Rickenbach,
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
and Silbernagel
2015
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
Miller et al. 2014
✓
Rabotyagov and
✓
✓
Lin 2013
✓
Miller, Snyder,
and Kilgore
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
2012
✓
Kelly, Germain,
✓
✓
and Stehman
2015
Finley and
✓
✓
✓
✓
Kittredge 2006
✓
✓
Wade and
Moseley 2011
Note. Other program attributes investigated in the literature: The requirement of a management plan (Fletcher, Kittredge, and Stevens 2009;
Dickinson et al. 2012; Markowski-Lindsay et al. 2011; Rabotyagov and Lin 2013; Knoot, Rickenbach, and Silbernagel 2015; Kelly, Germain,
and Stehman 2015; Wade and Moseley 2011; Miller et al. 2014; Finley and Kittredge 2006); an early withdrawal penalty (Fletcher, Kittredge,
and Stevens 2009; Dickinson et al. 2012; Markowski-Lindsay et al. 2011); payment mode (Kelly, Germain, and Stehman 2015); development
and/or timber rights conveyed (Kelly, Germain, and Stehman 2015); inspections (Knoot, Rickenbach, and Silbernagel 2015); enrolled acreage
(Markowski-Lindsay et al. 2011; Rabotyagov and Lin 2013).
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Table 2
Characteristics of sampled forest owners and their properties
Percent

Mean

S.D.

Range
Min.
Max.

Characteristics of forest owner
Age
64.2
11.2
47
91
Education
High school degree or equivalent
15.0
Some college (no degree)
16.7
College degree
40.0
Some graduate school
6.7
Graduate degree or higher
21.7
Gender (female)
28.3
Income
Less than $24,999
13.3
$25,000 - $49,999
10.0
$50,000 - $99,999
40.0
$100,000 or more
30.0
Unsure/Don’t know
6.7
Presence
15.3
14.9
0.1
58.0
Years of forest ownership
20.4
12.8
2.0
58.0
Sense of placea
0.0
1.0
-2.3
1.4
Characteristics of forest owners’ property
Forest size
6.9
8.4
1.0
51.0
Management plan present
31.7
Timber harvested for income generation
18.3
b
Economic value (thousands $US)
397.8
394.3
34.3
2553.0
a
Notes. Factor score calculated from modified version of Jorgensen and Stedman’s (2006)
psychometric scale
b Tax assessed value of entire parcel
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Table 3
Sampled forest owners’ sense of place towards their properties
Proportion of sampled forest owners
Neither
Complete
Moderate
disagree nor
Moderate
Sense of place statement item
disagreement
disagreement
agree
agreement
Everything about my wooded
16.7
16.7
27.8
13.0
land is a reflection of me
I feel that I can really be
myself when I am on my
8.9
1.8
28.6
1.9
wooded land
My wooded land reflects the
11.1
14.8
24.1
27.8
type of person I am
I feel relaxed when I’m on my
3.5
7.0
12.3
28.1
wooded land
I feel happiest when I’m on
7.1
8.9
21.4
26.8
my wooded land
My wooded land is my
8.9
10.7
28.6
19.6
favorite place to be
I really miss my wooded land
when I’m way from it for
16.0
10.0
32.0
20.0
too long
My wooded land is the best
place for doing the things
9.3
18.5
33.3
16.7
that I enjoy most
For doing the things that I
enjoy most, no other place
16.7
25.9
29.6
14.8
can compare to my wooded
land

Complete
agreement
25.9
13.5
22.2
49.1
35.7
32.1
22.0

22.2

13.0
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Table 4
Results of multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression
Independent variable
(fixed-effects)
Coef.
S.E.
Program attributes
Contract lengtha
15-year contract
-2.266
0.405
30-year contract
-4.855
0.947
Annual paymentb
$25 per acre annual
payment
2.917
0.623
$50 per acre annual
payment
4.702
0.780
Program
administrationc
Administered by a
state agency
0.451
0.405
Administered by a
federal agency
0.613
0.581
Characteristics of forest owner
Age
-0.059
0.037
Education
0.597
0.297
Gender
1.136
0.773
Income
-0.286
0.164
Presence
-0.005
0.028
Sense of place
-0.086
0.380
Characteristics of forest owners’ property
Size of forest stand
-0.030
0.020
Management plan
present
-1.122
0.803
Timber harvested for
income generation
1.411
0.898
Economic value
8.97e-07
9.08e-07
Constant

-1.995

2.964

Odds Ratio

S.E.

p > |z|

0.104
0.008

0.042
0.007

***
***

18.492

11.521

***

110.131

85.884

***

1.569

0.636

1.847

1.073

0.943
1.816
3.115
0.751
0.995
0.918

0.035
0.539
2.407
0.123
0.028
0.349

0.971

0.020

0.326

0.261

4.100
1.000

3.681
9.08e-07

0.136

0.403

**
*

Random-effects
Parameters
Respondent
(constant)
4.377
1.63
Notes. n = 60 (540 discrete choices); Wald 2 (16) = 68.24; p > 2 < 0.001; *** p < 0.01; ** p
< 0.05; * p < 0.10
a 5-year contract is the base category
b $5 per acre annual payment is the base category
c Administration by a federal agency is the base category
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Table 5. Revenue generated from payments for carbon sequestration programs relative to
timber harvest and development.
Average
Average
Years of
Years of
Annual
Contract
discounted
discounted
enrollment to
enrollment to
payment
length
annual
contract length
match timber
match land
per acre
(years)
revenuea
revenuea
valueb
valuec
$5
5
$47
$190
493
8376
$5
15
$30
$426
769
13072
$25
5
$353
$1,411
66
1128
$25
15
$261
$3,648
90
1527
$25
30
$96
$2,774
245
4159
$50
5
$654
$2,617
36
608
$50
15
$610
$8,540
38
652
Notes. Programs with the highest level of financial incentives ($50 per acre per year) were not
combined with the longest contract length (30 years) in the fractional factorial design.
a Annual discount rate of 4.0% applied (Folmer, Gabel, and Opschoor 1995).
b Mean total timber value was $23,398 (SD = $27,076). Timber value estimates derived from
on-site assessments of: number and type of tree species present; average tree age; maximum
diameter at breast height; and total forested area. Values were calculated only for forest
owners’ properties where on-site assessments were conducted (n = 41). This value does not
include any interest the forest owner would accrue from the timber harvest.
c Mean total land value was $397,821 (SD = $394,287).
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Figure 1. Study area (the counties included in the study are labeled A-E in the map inset; NLCD
refers to the USDA Forest Service’s National Land Cover Dataset).
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Figure 2. Discrete choice survey question.
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